In compiling the entry below, it occrred to me there may be readers here who don't have a copy of The Blog of War: Front-Line Dispatches from Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Blackfive-compiled collection of milblog entries from what might be called "the golden age". If you're one of those folks I'd urge you to get one.
Reading (or re-reading) these stories you (like me) might be reminded that everything done before "the surge" was not stupid, pointless, and wrong - and you might even come to share my complete disgust with those who now believe otherwise.
Not only was this war pre-emptive and poorly planned and event then poorly executed but your statement is based on the faulty premise that the surge was some sort of miracle cure that was successful. You can have "disgust" for those who don't share in your opinion...but your opinions aren't based in fact, and *in truth* ignore fact. Just not an effective way to engage in productive conversation...
Posted by momoftwo at January 5, 2009 03:58 PM
I was part of the surge, and that was my second tour. But you've misread me if you believe I'm claiming the surge was a miracle cure.
"Disgust" is too strong a word, disappointment too weak. Something in between.
As for mission planning and execution, such things never survive first contact. There's no news there. The surge was one of many adjustments made on a hell of a long road.
Posted by Greyhawk at January 5, 2009 04:48 PM
your opinions aren't based in fact, and *in truth* ignore fact.
and
some sort of miracle cure that was successful.
what fact -- or truth -- have you ignored, Greyhawk? it is momoftwo that ignores the fact that the Surge has been successful (maybe not a miracle, but certainly successful) in stemming the violence and cementing the victory in Iraq... and that must just frost those that had or so badly wanted (maybe still want) to declare the Iraq as lost.
and if disgust and disappointment don't cut it, I'd say that those people irritate the hell out of me.
Hmmmm, momoftwo must be a faithful Reid groupie. Her tripe sounds so familiar
If you're at a computer that doesn't allow streaming video here's the gist, On Meet the Press:
MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about the war in Iraq. In April of 2007, this is what you said: "I believe myself that ... this war is lost and the surge is not accomplishing anything." Were you wrong?
SEN. REID: David, I first met General David Petraeus in Iraq. He was training the Iraqi forces at that time. At that time, he knew it wasn't working. After he became the commander in Iraq, he and I sat down and talked. He said to me, and he said within the sound of everyone's voice, "The war cannot be won militarily." I said it differently than he did. But it needed a change in direction. Petraeus brought that about. He brought it about—the surge helped, of course it helped. But in addition to that, the urging of me and other people in Congress and the country dictated a change, and that took place. So...
Harry Reid says the Iraq War is still lost and that there is civil war in Iraq.
Apparently Da Nile isn't only a river in Egypt.
Posted by Mrs G at January 5, 2009 06:11 PM
1. Nothing which occurred before the surge was wasted, inept, or improperly authorized, planned, or executed. The plan was followed to the limits of its premises, and to the troops finest abilities. Until doctrine changed (and I remind you GreyHawk, of your own posts pointing to all the gnashing of teeth and insistence from Dhimmicrats that the Iraqis do more of their own fighting in 2004 AND 2005 from these same idiots who now say doing so was a mistake .... as if fully capable, professional, and competent military forces of any stripe rose within weeks from the ashes of a destroyed civilization), the plan was followed, and would have worked given another ten years for Iraqis to finally grow tired enough of killing each other and tougher Americans than they had ever dreamed of, instead of living for themselves.
momoftwo has short term and long term memory loss.... but I don't.
Our leaders did what they could with a recalcitrant and obstinate insurgent ideology, which insisted that Arabs are incapable of making anything good occur unless Allah magically willed it so, and that the use of Reason and Kindness towards their fellow Man was not to be trusted because infidels and apostates were inferior to Islamic ideals and deserved beheading, homicide bombing, murder and rape as answers to Peace.
Even without the Surge, Iraq would eventually have been pacified, even if only by their own exhaustion from slaughtering their neighbors. All we had to do was hang on.
momoftwo wouldn't understand History, Truth or Facts, even if she was bitten by them on the ass, they developed lockjaw, and were dragged to death behind her, because all she has is the certitude that Bush is evil, and War is perpetually wrong.
I suffer from no such illusions. And all I ever need to assure my certitude is to reread the stories of the Mumbai, London, Borneo, Madrid, Algeria, Kenya, Tanzanian, Morrocco, Istanbul, Iraq, Aden, Yemen, Saudi, Afghan, Pakistani, and 9-11 killers of innocents, and watch the beheading videos so vaunted by the press for recruiting Islamic terrorists worldwide, and yet, somehow, lacking in stiffening the resolve and disgust Westerners feel towards such a religion and ideology that massacres little girls going to school, rapes young women for sport, beheads their enemies to strike fear, and yet hides under a woman's burkha when confronted by Men who are only marginally more well armed than they are, except with the presence of Right and Goodness on their side.
The terrorist is a coward who chooses only innocent and weaker targets as victims because they cannot face Men who stand for Peace and Justice, wherever, and whomever they may be. Until Iraqis saw with their own eyes that American soldiers were morally and physically superior to anything a Koranic zealot could provide, they would always choose Islam over Infidel. Now, their choice is cloudy, and their experiences belie the usual propaganda they hear about American injustice.
A pox on momoftwo. The Truth, as unpleasant as it usually is, doesn't support her contention of anything in her statements. And you, and I, both know that is so.
Adam Ashton of the Modesto Bee reports on a California Guard unit's return to Iraq:
Veterans from the first tour describe it as marked by constant roadside attacks and ambiguous results. Some left with mixed feelings about Iraq's future.
"My experience last time wasn't the greatest," Adame said. "When we left, it hadn't gotten any better. It was just as active as when we started. We took hundreds of detainees, hundreds of rockets, off the streets, and there were still IEDs."
Other veterans who'd joined the battalion since that tour said they had similar doubts about Iraq after they finished deployments with different Army and Marine contingents.
"Last time I was very unsure," said Spc. Jeremy Calgaro, 27, of Patterson, Calif., who's on his third tour in Iraq. His past deployments brought him to the country with the Army during the 2003 invasion and in 2005.
He came back wanting to see how Iraq had changed.
"The battalion lost 17 of its roughly 700 Baghdad-deployed troops in 2005," Ashton reports. And that wasn't their only misfortune:
The Army ousted its first commander in Iraq, Lt. Col. Patrick Frey, in the wake of a controversy over abused detainees in one of his companies. A roadside bomb killed his successor, Col. William Wood, in October 2005, three months after he'd taken over.
The battalion persevered and returned home with fanfare in January 2006. Gov. Schwarzenegger dubbed the troops "true action heroes."
But shortly after, Robert C. J. Parry - a veteran of the deployment - would write in the LA Times:
From the first weeks of our mobilization in August 2004, we were in the spotlight. We were the battalion “mired in scandal.” We were, according to the disgruntled, poor in training and morale. Once in Iraq, we were the battalion that suffered casualties seemingly faster than anyone could count: 17 killed in action and nearly 100 wounded in 12 months. We were the battalion whose commander, Col. William W. Wood, became the highest-ranking soldier to die in action. Our previous commander was relieved of duty after a scandal involving the abuse of Iraqi prisoners. Even as we rolled out each day to confront terrorists, we were known at home primarily for things that had nothing to do with the job we did or how we did it.
Over the course of 18 months, the 600 soldiers of the 184th experienced almost every high and low a band of brothers could, from great distinction to shocking heartbreak. But what never made it into print were the things that will mark our hearts until well after we become the old-timers down at the VFW.
We served with honor. We served with valor. We earned distinction.
Google us to find the litany of supposed woe. But if you want to know the real story of our battalion, go find Sgt. Thomas Kruger and ask him about April 5, 2005.
On that bright spring morning, with his legs shattered, Kruger dragged himself across 100 feet of debris and shrapnel to reach Cpl. Glenn Watkins, who had been mortally wounded moments earlier by the same ghastly roadside bomb.
You might also ask anyone from our ranks about Staff Sgt. Steve Nunez. Broken and bloodied by an IED, he was ordered home to recuperate after refusing to go voluntarily. He rejoined us to carry the fight forward, refusing the chance to stay home.
There were no front-page headlines for Kruger, Nunez or even Sgt. 1st Class Tom Stone, who covered a wounded subordinate’s body with his own to protect that soldier from a secondary attack that could have come at any moment.
Stone, a Los Angeles Police Department officer, and Kruger, a paramedic on movie sets, were awarded Bronze Stars for their valor. Nunez, a Riverside metalworker, received our awe and admiration, and I hope yours too.
Equally deserving of recognition were Sgt. 1st Class Chris Chebatah and 1st Lt. Ky Cheng. One terrible September night, an armored personnel carrier in their patrol was destroyed by a tremendous blast and flipped, pinning a soldier. Even while taking enemy fire and directing the care for casualties around them, they rigged a chain to pull the 10-ton vehicle off him. The effort was successful but ultimately futile.
So far, 14 of our soldiers have been decorated for valor and another 48 have earned the Bronze Star for service. But that cannot be found in print.
Our unit – supposedly just a band of weekend warriors from the National Guard – was selected by the Army’s renowned 3rd Infantry Division to take on its primary challenge: taking control of a sector of south Baghdad that was home to leading Baathists and Al Qaeda fanatics. In that capacity, we conducted more than 7,000 combat patrols totaling nearly half a million man-hours. We captured more insurgents in one month than did whole brigades. We stand nominated (with the rest of our brigade) for a Valorous Unit Award.
But instead, people who didn’t know the first thing about us trumpeted the misdeeds of a handful of young men who scoffed at the concepts of honor and duty that our commander invoked.
And if all that sounds familiar to milblog readers, it's not just because the story is typical of media coverage of most units that deployed to Iraq when the fighting was heaviest, the outcome uncertain, and the battle far from won. Milblog readers will recognize the story as that told by Major K, Red2alpha, Rusten Currie, and Danjel Bout (Thunder6) on their blogs Maj K, This is Your War, Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum, and 365 and a Wakeup.
"I patrolled the streets of Baghdad’s elite Karrada neighborhood and its insurgent-rich Doura sector, shaking people’s hands and learning their problems." Parry wrote in his Times op-ed in February, 2006 - in stark contrast to the now popular (and erroneous) narrative that 'everything before the surge was wrong'.
I lived and worked alongside American contractors upgrading a key power plant. I trained Iraqi police, saw their enthusiasm and came to understand their different approach to things. I worked as a junior officer on our battalion staff, witnessing how the decisions governing the street fight were shaped. I was shot at and attacked with IEDs.
I saw the successes. I struggled with the failures. But most important, I saw people who once had nothing now bursting with hope and thanks.
*****
And now, three years later, in defiance of the also-current narrative that there are no stories left to tell from Iraq, reporter Adam Ashton is with the Battalion for their return.
"Last time I was very unsure," said Spc. Jeremy Calgaro, 27, of Patterson, Calif., who's on his third tour in Iraq. His past deployments brought him to the country with the Army during the 2003 invasion and in 2005.
He came back wanting to see how Iraq had changed. He sees the differences in flourishing agricultural fields that remind him of home in the San Joaquin Valley, and in positive interactions he's had with Iraqis.
<...>
"Here we are, we're doing our jobs and things have gotten much better," he said.
Spc. Ralph Salazar said he was enthusiastic about his mission in Iraq as a Marine in 2003 and 2004. He'd smoked a cigar with a close friend on the roof of a Baghdad palace to celebrate his 20th birthday in 2004.
His feelings about the war began to shift around 2006, when news reports showed Iraq descending into bloody sectarian violence.
He heard about improvements before he left the U.S. for his current tour, but the better conditions still startled him when he arrived in November.
"I was still expecting to spend some time running for the bunkers," said the 24-year-old from Fresno, Calif. "I do have to say I appreciate the calm.
"The fact that we've been here and made all this progress, it validates everything for me," Salazar said. "It did matter."
Along with that, in one of the most disheartening signs of victory I've ever heard, Calgaro says he "also sees less mail from the states, another sign to him that the war is going well."
yeah... some day (soon) it will be just like a PCS rotation through Korea or Okinawa... with a stray bullet, RPG or IED... nothing to see here. these aren't the droids we're looking for. move along.
Along with that, in one of the most disheartening signs of victory I've ever heard, Calgaro says he "also sees less mail from the states, another sign to him that the war is going well."
As I type this, Soldiers' Angels has 692 soldiers awaiting adoption.
This story includes no links to or citations of mainstream media reports from Afghanistan. It's a pure-milblogger look at elements of counter-insurgency warfare there. The key piece: a report of denial of an illumination round, and its impact on one mission (failure). Said denial apparently (from what I gather from one side of the story and some personal experience) based on fear that the (parachute-equipped) round could potentially damage the area (perhaps the fire threat?) and therefore do more harm than good.
Meanwhile, ISAF releases a video (not too graphic - the camera fails) of a terrorist strike killing over a dozen school children. The impact of such an episode is blunted when the enemy can counter with examples of collateral damage caused by our own actions, "intent" being an argument that carries little weight with the jury of public opinion.
No one can deny the importance to successful counter-insurgency ops of minimizing our own collateral damage while exploiting the enemy's desire to maximize the same, or the equal importance of getting that same message out to a public both within and beyond the borders of Afghanistan. But while both are crucial battles in the same war, is this the right balance between winning hearts and minds and successful kinetic ops? Can we win both?
And if not, which is more important to winning the war?
American airpower seems to have lost some of its mystique in the war in Afghanistan. American air dominance, including its ability to conduct airstrikes in close air support of coalition troops, has been and continues to be critical to the Afghan war effort. Close air support, in particular, is allowing the United States and NATO to fight an energized insurgency with far fewer troops than it needs. Yet if one follows press reports from the Afghan theatre, what Eliot Cohen once characterized as an “unusually seductive form of military strength,” has become a source of consternation for the United States and a ready cudgel with which to beat America’s troubled prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Tragic news stories of American airstrikes gone wrong and their resultant civilian casualties trump more mundane analyses of the Afghan government’s failings or the (by now routine) atrocities committed by Afghan insurgents. American airpower, it seems, has become a victim of its own misunderstood successes in the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo bombing campaign. Its famed precision makes any costly error unacceptable, inflames Afghan and international public opinion, and forces American defense officials and military leaders to observe endless rituals of public apology. The irreconcilable conflict between the immutably violent nature of war and the fiction of a “bloodless” use of force has trapped the United States between the Scylla of military exigency and the Charybdis of public sentiment.
This paper will briefly examine the issue of airstrikes during close air support (CAS) operations in the Afghan theatre. It will give a broad overview of the use of airpower in OEF, then examine the controversy surrounding American airstrikes in Afghanistan. It will take the position that given the existing constraints on the American war effort (troop shortages, the vast and difficult Afghan terrain, limited human intelligence, cross-border insurgent sanctuaries, and increased insurgent activity), CAS is vital to the prosecution of the Afghan war. It will further argue that, even as mounting civilian casualties are alienating the Afghan populace, excessive restraint in the use of airstrikes may be handicapping U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts.
The sweat under my IBA and in my ACUs is starting to freeze, I can feel it against my skin. I'm wishing right now that I'd put on some long underwear before we'd come out here, it's too late for that now. Currently, we're holding about 200 meters short of the target khalat, it's aprox 2330. The moon has finally risen giving us better illumination than when we started this about 4 hours ago.
<...>
The ANA have no night vision capabilty, so a key piece of this plan is that the US will fire illumination rounds via 60 milimeter mortars once we dismount allowing the ANA to see as we move through the woodpiles. All of the ETTs have night vision.
Sounds great, we're going whack these guys that have been trying to kill us for three days. Yeah Team!!
<...>
The ANA reach the dismount point and we all get out, prepping to move through the wood piles. These piles could hide anythig, giant stacks with limbs and logs sticking out everywhere, trying to see a person in this is going to difficult at best. Once we're all ready I call for the illumination rounds.
DENIED! Because the battalion commander 100 miles away thinks it's to dangerous. His concern is that the canister that the illum round is in will land on a khalat in the area, this canister weighs about 8 pounds. Disregard the fact that without this illum the ANA can't see anything. 8 pounds hitting a house or us not being able to see? I'm coming down on the side of us being able to see the enemy.
I call for the illum round again. DENIED! What the...? This guy is 100 miles away and making decisions that should be made by us on the ground, we're the ones closing with the enemy. I guess empowering subordinates and letting ground commanders make the call isn't taught anymore.
We now have a serious problem. The ANA can't see but the ETTs can, guess we'll now have to move in front of the ANA clearing through the piles of wood. So that's what we do. The ETTs get in front and start moving forward. There are about 50 of us in this position and only four of us can see anything.
Read the whole thing. I'd add only that an illumination round is parachute-equipped, and designed to fall slowly to the earth.
Yes, Afghanistan is a Rubik's Cube. Many people have solved Rubik's Cubes at some point in their lives; sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly. The proof is in the pudding, as they say, and we are spinning the individual blocks around in a seemingly disjointed and random pattern instead of in a coordinated series of movements that see the whole cube. I, like CPT Hill, 1SG Scott, and Vampire 06, was working at moving one or two of the little blocks that make up the larger cube, and every once in a while the Big Hand reaches in gives the cube a couple of quick twists that undo considerable effort or short-circuit a favorable turn in battlefield fortunes. We in the Army have a polysyllabic yet simple word for this effect, but I'll give you a more generally acceptable and family-friendly word that starts with the same letter; counterproductive.
As the warnings of many experts and pundits ring, our window of opportunity in Afghanistan is growing smaller and smaller. It's time to reconsider... read unscrew... ourselves in how we are approaching this war. A symptom of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.
*****
Moral conundrums have never troubled the enemy.
That's a video of an apparently well-timed attack that killed over a dozen school children. "It's another aspect of this war that makes it tougher on our own troops," John Donovan writes, "especially when their professional prowess and skill cause the enemy to deflect to softer, easier targets - those targets are precisely the people they are trying to protect."
The message from CJTF101 is simple - it was the closer to the notice. These photos and videos provide further proof the Afghan militants are not interested in the welfare or benefit of the Afghan people.
And one can hope that the Afghan people see it that way, though we're swimming against an millenniums-long experience that tells these people to submit to he who has the stronger tribe. And that ruthlessness is a component of strength. They know they can get upset with us about civilian casualties, and we will abase ourselves, express heartfelt remorse, and, perhaps most importantly, pay. Unfortunately, for many Afghans, that's a sign of weakness, not strength, whereas we see it as a component of strength, strength tempered with compassion.
They know the Taliban will remain, they aren't sure about us.
*****
Update/More:
Video: Jimbo from Blackfive talks information warfare on CNN, and answers the question "why are the insurgents better at it than we are?" (Some background on the CNN/terrorist video he references - and al Qaeda's media strategy - here.)
Trivia - Christian was portrayed in films by:
Errol Flynn in In the Wake of the Bounty (1933)
Clark Gable in Mutiny on the Bounty (1935)
Marlon Brando in Mutiny on the Bounty (1962)
Mel Gibson in The Bounty (1984)
President-elect Barack Obama will probably tear down long-standing barriers between the U.S.’s civilian and military space programs to speed up a mission to the moon amid the prospect of a new space race with China.
Obama’s transition team is considering a collaboration between the Defense Department and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration because military rockets may be cheaper and ready sooner than the space agency’s planned launch vehicle, which isn’t slated to fly until 2015, according to people who’ve discussed the idea with the Obama team.
<...>
Meanwhile, Chinese state-owned companies already are assembling heavy-lift rockets that could reach the moon, with a first launch scheduled for 2013.
Raising the question: who will be the first milblogger on the moon?
A New Year prediction from J.D. Johannes: "The SOFA agreement with Iraq will be broadly interpreted to keep US Forces in most Joint Security Stations."
"When asked how they feel about President-elect Barack Obama as commander in chief, six out of 10 active-duty service members say they are uncertain or pessimistic." Says the Army (and Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) Times.
More specifically, only 25 percent say "pessimistic". Thirty-three percent responded "optimistic", and a slightly larger group (35%) answered "uncertain" - with another eight percent claiming "no opinion". Some may be inclined to offer exclamation points to those results, but this analysis sounds about right to me:
Peter Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University who has written extensively about civil-military relations, said a degree of uncertainty among service members toward Obama is appropriate, given their questions about how he will govern as commander in chief.
“Those numbers don’t convince me he has got a big problem on his hands because what he is seeing is not military hostility, but rather military caution, and caution that is reasonable because he has never been in the position of this office,” Feaver said. “It’s sensible and understandable that they have doubts about him.
The survey results are from just under 1,400 respondents. From personal experience I'd speculate that if there's any difference between these results and those from a hypothetical survey of every man, woman and child in the US military today it would be a larger percentage of "uncertain" responses at the expense of the optimistic and pessimistic crowds in this result. But uncertainty is anathema to the military mind; in training, planning, and execution of military operations one hundred percent of the effort is aimed at reducing it. In a change of Commander-in-Chief a degree of uncertainty is unavoidable, amplified when his or her political affiliation is different from that of the previous CinC, and immeasurable in the specific case of Barack Obama, whose exposure to military members (and political experience in general) is perhaps less by orders of magnitude (if such things were measurable by some unit) than any previous president-elect. This is not to imply he's unqualified for the job, doomed to failure, or undeserving of the support of the troops - far from it, in fact. Just that "uncertainty" is the only sensible response to the question, and that uncertainty makes most military people uncomfortable (most people, for that matter), to say the least.
But most can accept a degree of temporary uncertainty. A large percentage of military members tend to be pragmatic (if not jaded), and with a history of being promised much and given little tend to be of the "I'll believe it when I see it" variety - and apply that philosophy to forecasts of doom or improvement. "Plan for the worst and hope for the best" is a well-honed sword (or perhaps solid shield) found in the arsenal of all successful military leaders. Some might say "I'm hoping for the best, therefore I'm optimistic", others that "I'm planning for the worst, therefore I'm pessimistic" - but there's little real distinction in their positions. Likewise there's not much separation from those who have "no opinion" or express uncertainty; all are describing the same terrain from their own perspective, but all are standing on common ground.
Having served under four presidents myself I offer generic advice to younger troops: "You will be disappointed and delighted by events of the next four years". That and "hope for the best, expect the worst, plan for both and everything in between".
I'd say all bets are off (or on, depending on your perspective) until he actually DOES something (good or bad, right or wrong...) The military is just like the rest of us: trying not to prejudge him (with no viable record of achievement, it's tough to decide either way) but we'll all be watching carefully.
While SAT scores may be “considerably lower” than those of Columbia and New York University, students come to Lang not as a substitute for these universities but for a completely different experience.
We came to the New School’s undergraduate liberal arts college in search of a creative and critical community of students who were interested in social theory and social protest. We wanted to know how the world worked, and we wanted to experience New York City in its most unmitigated form.
Many of us could have easily gone to Columbia or N.Y.U., with acceptance letters and scholarships — yet we chose a college and university where are voices could be heard.
It is heartening to see that this practice continues and has permeated all parts of the university, and no doubt the undergraduates are continuing in the tradition of criticism and protest.
A college that specializes in "social theory and social protest", Who'da thunk?
A little after 11:30 p.m., Mr. Kerrey emerged from a university building on Fifth Avenue south of 14th Street to a sea of a few hundred protesters chanting for his resignation. As Mr. Kerrey walked down Fifth Avenue toward 12th Street, about 30 protesters began following him, some of them shouting insults.
As the crowd’s pace quickened, so did Mr. Kerrey’s. Then, Mr. Kerrey, who lost a part of his leg in Vietnam and wears a prosthesis, broke into a run. The protesters gave chase. Mr. Kerrey turned left on a cross street and ducked into a brownstone.
At some point in the confrontation, a protester threw a tomato at Mr. Kerrey.
<...>
Mr. Kerrey, the former governor and United States senator from Nebraska who was given an overwhelming vote of no confidence from the university’s faculty in recent days, showed up at 11:30 a.m. asking to address the dissident students, but they voted not to hear him out.
The student demonstration began Wednesday evening in the ground-floor cafeteria, with about 50 of them staying overnight citing a list of grievances with the Kerrey administration, dating back to his early support of the Iraq war. They adopted a list of eight demands including a greater student voice in university affairs and the resignations of Mr. Kerrey; James Murtha, the executive vice president; and Robert Millard, treasurer of the board of trustees, who students said was connected to a private security firm working in Iraq.
“Once the faculty vote came out, we thought now is the time,” said Jacob Blumfeld, a graduate student in philosophy.
On Wednesday night, the students pushed wooden tables against the cafeteria’s front door and blocked a rear corridor to the street with heavy recycling bins. Marcus Michelson, also a graduate student in philosophy, said the sit-in was meant to show that the students were serious about having a seat at the negotiating able. “This is about starting a dialogue, and to do that you have to be seen as an equal,” he said. “People just don’t give equality, you have to take it.”
Cannot say I have always agreed with his politics but these protesters will never be equal to Bob Kerrey
So, as part of our holiday tradition I sent Mrs G up into the attic a few weeks ago to drag out all the Christmas decorations. Way back in a corner under an old milk crate practically hidden by spiderwebs she found an old video from one of my early-70s T.V. appearances. This might have been filmed for Dick Clark's New Years Rockin' Eve '73, I can't remember. Anyhow, here it is...
"Hey", you might ask, "how come we never see your face?" Simple, really. Back in those days (or so they told me) David Cassidy had a contract with the network guaranteeing they'd never show anyone better looking than him.
"What about the rest of your band?" You inquire. Also simple: they were just too shy.
I'm sure the President-elect will put this on the top of his "to-do" list...
Earlier this month, Reprieve and the U.K. Musicians Union launched Zero dB, a "silent protest" over the use of music in interrogations. According to Reprieve, many of its clients have been subjected to hours of music played at deafening volume -- sometime for days or even weeks on end...
This has musicians furious. Last week, Trent Reznor of Nine Inch Nails even suggested he might pursue legal action to stop the practice.
Chloe Davis, a researcher for Reprieve, told Danger Room the Zero dB campaign was planning to work with prominent musicians to lobby the incoming administration.
"It is really important that we seize the chance to alert Obama to this practice," she said.
I'm shocked, shocked I tell you, at some of the callous comments left at Danger Room. "Does this mean I can have my neighbor charged with torture for playing his music to loud?" and "Yeah, I can see how a group like Nine Inch Nails might not want their music associated with anything dark or evil."
In a somewhat similar vein: "Back in the day," says Chuck Z, "I compiled a playlist that we could blast from the psyop truck when we entered a ville for a "dynamic" entry and house search." That list is at the link.
And there's nothing on it by Nine Inch Nails. But this is there:
Welcome to the Dawn Patrol, our daily roundup of information on the War on Terror and other topics - from the MilBlogs and other sources around the world. If you're a blogger, you can join the conversation. If you link to any of these stories, add a link to the Dawn Patrol too and your trackback will be added to the list. Hat Tips to the Dawn Patrol are greatly appreciated.
Support Our Troops, Read Their Stories
----------------------------
IRAQ
Meanwhile, back at to the Front -- [Greyhawk]
Adam Ashton of the Modesto Bee reports on a California Guard unit's return to Iraq:
...three years later, in defiance of the also-current narrative that there are no stories left to tell from Iraq, reporter Adam Ashton is with the Battalion for their return.
Record US deaths in Afghanistan in 2008, lowest in Iraq -- [AFP]
WASHINGTON (AFP) — American troops suffered the most losses in 2008 since the start of the Afghanistan war due to a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda, while witnessing the lowest US death toll in six years in Iraq, which saw a relatively improved security.
Harry Reid Says War in Iraq Is Still Lost
On Meet the Press with David Gregory the worst Senate Majority Leader in history Harry Reid says the Iraq War is still lost and that there is civil war in Iraq and Israel and that he helped save Iraq.
MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about the war in Iraq. In April of 2007, this is what you said: "I believe myself that ... this war is lost and the surge is not accomplishing anything." Were you wrong? SEN. REID: David, I first met General David Petraeus in Iraq. He was training the Iraqi forces at that time. At that time, he knew it wasn't working. After he became the commander in Iraq, he and I sat down and talked. He said to me, and he said within the sound of everyone's voice, "The war cannot be won militarily." I said it differently than he did. But it needed a change in direction. Petraeus brought that about. He brought it about—the surge helped, of course it helped. But in addition to that, the urging of me and other people in Congress and the country dictated a change, and that took place. So...
More news -- [Wings Over Iraq - in Iraq]
It's been a busy week in Iraq. Not because the US has been chasing down insurgents, but because so many bases are being handed over to the Iraqi Army, it's almost difficult to keep track of them. Whearas just two years ago, Army helicopters were burning thousands of blade hours taking troops to the battle, now they're scurrying back and forth just to accomodate bases that seem to be closing every day.
International Zone Change of Command
Footage of Iraqi officials and Soldiers speaking at a ceremony celebrating the change of command of the international zone from coalition forces to Iraqi forces.
Security Agreement -- [S4 at War - in Iraq]
One of the biggest impacts of the security agreement for me is related to our attempt to return the roads to normalcy. Our large supply convoys are new restricted to night movements. That means I can only go to the large supply hub in our region in the middle of the night. This works fine for most situations as our support Battalion can prepare most of our supplies for us to pick up. A lot of the things I do, however, ...
Iraq takes control of Green Zone
A New Year Brings Changes to Iraq -- [Soldiering On - in Iraq]
Today is January 1st, 2009. Last night at 2359 the United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing MNF-I's presence in Iraq expired. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States and her coalition allies (Poland, Great Britain, Australia, South Korea, and many others) have operated under a United Nations Mandate.
As Iraqi Security improved, the need for that mandate and the corresponding operational abilities it provided were seen as less necessary.
So there I was... -- [Bad Dogs and Such - in Iraq]
in deepest, darkest Eye-Rak. Sure, some folks were worried about IEDs, suicide bombers, and random small arms fire. But I knew we were in trouble when, standing in a quiet village, I turned and saw...
Iraqis hope to sue U.S. troops under new accord-- [McClatchy]
The families of three men who were killed last week during a search of a grain warehouse want to press charges against American soldiers under the terms of a new security agreement between the U.S. and Iraq.
Troops in Iraq Allowed Two Beers During the Superbowl -- [Stars & Stripes]
Multi-National Division–Baghdad has received permission to let its units enjoy an honest-to-goodness beer on game day instead of the near-beer soldiers usually quaff in downrange DFACs. The approval comes with plenty of time for the beer to be shipped into theater. This Super Bowl will be a strictly controlled exception to the long-standing policy
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
Illumination -- [Greyhawk]
This story includes no links to or citations of mainstream media reports from Afghanistan. It's a pure-milblogger look at elements of counter-insurgency warfare there. The key piece: a report of denial of an illumination round, and its impact on one mission (failure). Said denial apparently (from what I gather from one side of the story and some personal experience) based on fear that the (parachute-equipped) round could potentially damage the area (perhaps the fire threat?) and therefore do more harm than good.
Meanwhile,...
"High Time" To Move Marines To Afghanistan -- [CBS News]
The Commandant of the US Marine Corps says it's "high time" his troops leave Iraq and take their battle skills to Afghanistan. "We are a fighting machine," Gen. James Conway tells CBS News, and the fight is now in Afghanistan... Their role in Iraq, he says, has been reduced to nation building...
"That’s not what we do," Conway told Marines in Afghanistan. "Where there’s a fight, that’s where the Marine Corps is needed."
Snipers and Asymmetric Warfare in Afghanistan -- [Captain's Journal]
In January of 2008 The Captain’s Journal predicted that the so-called spring offensive by the Taliban would be more asymmetric than conventional and kinetic. True, there have been stark reminders that the Taliban, in this case the Tehrik-i-Taliban, were capable of highly conventional and kinetic engagements, such as with the battle of Wanat. But there have also been reminders of just how badly the Taliban lose when they choose to go head-to-head in kinetic engagements with U.S.
The Road to Success is not Paved at ALL! -- [AFGHANISTAN SHRUGGED - in Afghanistan]
...The Taliban’s offensive against the road was a miserable failure for them. Not because they didn’t destroy many parts of it, they did, but because the populace questioned why they were attacking it. Attacking the ring road impacts US, NATO and ANA forces very little. We have helicopters and aircraft to resupply and get around. The Afghans living here don’t have these; so impinging on the ring road affects them greatly. The question they were starting to ask, “Why are you destroying that which helps us”. The Taliban had no answer.
Have You Ever Felt Truly Helpless... -- [Embrace The Suck - in Afghanistan]
Some of these rules prevent movement. Movement of any kind, vehicle, helicopter, plane or LPC is prohibited. (LPC=leather personnel carrier AKA Boots) Usually these rules about movement work out in our favor. If the rules say we cannot move for whatever reason then we don't have anything to do and we get to go back to sleep, any day when you get to go back to sleep is a glorious day in the military.
Sometimes, like today, these rules really bite you in the ass. Sometimes your buddies are outside the wire and you can't go and get them and bring them home. So there will be no sleep had today,
Blurred edges -- [Frontline - Alex Strick van Linschoten - in Afghanistan]
Back out in the desert, people started to arrive as word had spread that some musicians had come to perform at Ibrahim Khalifa Baba, the shrine of an old ’saint’. I sat next to the head of one of Kandahar’s government administrations, who had also come out to the shrine. He received a call from one of the police checkpoints further north of where we were.
“I have 8 Taliban with weapons in a car who say that they want to come to Ibrahim Khalifa Baba. What should we do with them?” the policeman asked. “Let them come!” my friend replied. “They’re probably just coming to enjoy the music. Who are we to stop them?”
And so they came. The reader should
, the Blackfive-compiled collection of milblog entries from what might be called "the golden age". If you're one of those folks I'd urge you to get one.
